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LANDMARK COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
v. 
VIRGINIA State/Criminal TIMELY 
SUMMARY: Appellant-newspaper challenges on First Amendment 
grounds its misdemeanor conviction for violation of a Va. statute 
which provides for the confidentiality of all papers filed with and 
proceedings before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (Com-
mission) . 
~ 
FACTS: Art. VI, §10 of the 1971 Constitution of Va. mandates 
the Commission "to investigate charges which would be the basis for 
retirement, censure, or removal of a judge." It also specifies that 
"(p)roceedings before the Commission shall be confidential." Va. Code 
§2.1-37.13 provides that "all papers filed with and proceedings before 
the Commission ••. including the identification of the subject judg e 
••• shall be confidential and shall not be divulged by any person to 
r 
- 2 -
anyone except the Commission, except th'at the record of any proceed-
ing filed with the Supreme Court shall lose its confidential character 
" The statute also subjects to a misdemeanor penalty "any person 
who shall divulge information in violation of (its provisions)." rc.-\ 
On Oct. 4. 1975. appellant oublished in The Virginian-Pilot-~ 
a newspaper of general circulation in the Tidewater area of Va.--an 
article stating that the Commission had conducted a "formal hearing 
concerning oossible disciolinary actio~ aaainst" a named iudge and 
that the hearina "aooarently stemmed from charges of incompetence 
aaainst the ... judge." Aooellant was tried and convicted for violatio 
of ~2.1-37.13 and fined S500. 
DECISION BELOW: Va. · sc, one justice dissenting, sustained the 
constitutionality~£ the challenged st~tute. The majority first 
rejected appellant's claim that the statute must be strictly construed 
to apply only to the first act of disclosure by an actual participant 
in the proceedings. The court found that the proscription running 
against disclosure--until the filing of a formal complaint with Va. 
SC--is so clear from the statutory language as to render unreasonable 
an interpretation limiting the language only to participants in the 
Commission proceedings or to make actionable only the initial disclosur 
'J'he court, . rej ectj ng appellant's contention--abandoned in this 
Court-~that the law . imposed a prior restraint on the press, considered 
whether the "subsequent punishment" imposed by the statute violated 
the guarantee of a free press. The court, citing a series of decision s 
applying the "clear and present danger" test to cases involving public CJ 
~ -
tions alleged to imperil the orderly administration of justice, rejectc 
appellant's view that the test must be satisfied by production of "actu 
facts" to show a clear and present danger. Bridges, et al. involved 
*Br1dges v. Cal1forn1a, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Penneknm_e v. Florida, 328 
U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. !!_arvey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); and- Wood v. 
Geor9ia, 370 u.s. 375 (1962). 
( 
- ~ -
the common law power of a court to punish allegedly contemptuous out-of 
court statements concerning pending ca?es. By contrast, ·the court foun 
the power of a Va. court to impose the instant punishment is fixed by 
statute. The court concluded that §2.1-37.13 represents a legislative 
judgment, coupled with the statement of public intent expressed in the 
Va. Constitution, that a clear and present danger to the orderly 
7 \ administration of justice would be created by premature disclosure of 
\ the confidential proceedings of the Commission. The court held "the 
judgment imposing the sanction in this case is fortified against 
(appellant's) constitutional attack because it is 'encased in the 
armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation' [Brid~, 314 U.S. at 
261] • II 
) 
Va. SC further found that the challenged statute places the leas t 
possible restraint upon the public interest while assuring the effectiv 
functioning of the Commission. It stressed that, when a formal com-
plaint is filed, the entire record of Commission proceedings becomes 
public and that the statute does not curtail general comment or 
criticism concerning a judge or the conduct of 'udicial affairs_ 
Justice Poff dissented on the ground that the majority erred in 
inferring the existence of a clear and present danger from the mere 
enactment o~ a penal statute. Noting a "legal presumption" in favor 
of the First Amendment, the dissent would require evidence--not produc e 
by the Commonwealth in this case--showing a clear and present danger 7 ( 
to a legitimate governmental interest in order to justify any statutory 
exception to the constitutional guarantee. 
CONTENTIONS: Appellant asserts that the publication of 
truthful statements may not be the subject of civil or criminal 
sanctions where public af~airs are concerned. Rather, the Commission 
- ... 
may withhold what it can and the press may publish what it learns, 
~- ~ ........ 
the balance favoring public discourse. Appellee counters that the 
Commonwealth has followed the procedure outlined in Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975), i.e., to "avoid public 
documentation or other exposure of private information" where privacy 
interests in judicial proceedings are to be protected. 
z(? Appellant finds the clear and present danger test applicable 
' here, but argues that proof of actual facts establishing that the 
expression in question creates such a danger to the administration of 
justice is essential. [The Commonwealth offered no such proof at 
trial.] Appellant emphasizes that there is no support in the legisla-
\ 
made any finding of a clear and present danger. Appellee tracks the 
tive history for the court's conclusion that the Va. Gen. Assembly 
D 
va. sc on this point. 
( Appellant attacks the statute as vague arguing that: the meaning -
of "divulge'' is unclear; there is no indication here that the published 
information consisted of "papers filed with and proceedings before the 
Commission;'' the statute gives no fair warning that it applies to 
parties who obtain the information after initial disclosure by 
parties privy to it or that its sweep encompasses the press or that 
it applies to all information concerning a Commission proceeding whethe2 
or. not such information was obtained from ma·terial before the Commission . 
Appellant also complains that the statute is unconstitutionally over-
broad insofar as it prohibits publication of the charge that impropriet: 
prevented an incompetent judge from having a complaint filed against 
him, Also, appellant contends that readers of the article repeat 
what they read at their pe~il. 
2\ppellee notes that the vagueness e relating to what material , 
are encompassed within the statute was not raised in va. SC and should 
( 
not be considered. 
DISCUSSION: It appears that some 40 jurisdictions provide for 
similar judicial review commissions but, according to appellee, only -
Hawaii and Va. impose criminal sanctions for breach of confidentiality. 
----- -'--- --------------------------
Following decision of this case in Va. SC, USDC (ED Va.) (Merhige ) 
issued a TRO restraining prosecution of a Va. TV station under the 
statute challenged here. The order has since expired. Thereafter, a 
motion for a TRO against the prosecution of a Richmond publisher was 
denied by Judge Warriner who, according to appellant, stated his belief 
:; that the state law was unconstitutional, but, in light of the Va. SC 
decision, was unabl 
al." 
The issue her 
criminal sanction i 
to find it "patently and flagrantly unconstitution-
is subs~ial~Appellee suggests that the 
posed by Va. is tne remedy suggested in the 
('-" concurring opinions in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713 (1971). y consideration may be warranted. 
There is a to affirm. 
6/1/77 Goltz Va. SC op in appx. 
PJN 
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No. 76-1450 Landmark Communications v. Commonwealth of Va. 
This appeal from the Virginia Supreme Court involves 
the validity of the Virginia statute that implements the 
Virginia constitutional provisions with respect to a "Judicial 
Inquiry and Review Commission". 
Section 2.1-37.13 provides for the confidentiality of 
all papers filed with and proceedings before the Commission. 
It also provides: 
Any~rs~n ~h~ shall divulge information in violation 
o f e provisions of this section shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor". 
The Virginia-Pilot published an article that 
identified a judge who had been under investigation by the 
Commission. The newspaper was prosecuted and convicted of a 
misdemeanor and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction. It sustained the validity of the confidentiality 
provision against First Amendment and vagueness challenges. 
Article 6, § 10 of the Constitution of Virginia 
requires the General Assembly to create a Judicial Inquiry and 
Review Commission, and provides that: 
2. 
Proceedings before the Commission that be confidential. 
The Constitutional provision does not specify that 
infringement of the confidentiality may be punished as a 
crime. Indeed, the constitutional mandate is general in its 
~ 
terms, and is not at issue in this case.* 
I have read the principal briefs, and it seems to me 
that appellant must win on the First Amendment issue. I agree 
that the public interest probably would be better served if the 
confidential portion of the Commission's work were 
confidential. In many ways, it resembles that of a grand 
jury. If an employee of the Commission divulged confidential 
information, perhaps penalties could be imposed. But here a 
newspaper apparently obtained the information by a leak from an 
unknown source. While its publication may well have been 
irre~nsible, I think it was protected by the First Amendment. 
~ 
As the appellant's brief states: "The Commission may withhold 
and keep secret what it can; the press may print what it 
learns." Br. 25. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
*I was a member of the Constitutional Revision Commisson that 
included this article. Three present members of the Virginia 
Supreme Court also were on the Commission: Justices Harrison 
(Chairman of the Commission), Harman and Cochran. All three of 
these Justices participated in the decision below. Although I 
"passed" when the jurisdictional statement was under discussion 
at our Conference last Term, I now see no reason why I should 
not participate. 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy Bregstein DATE: Jan. 2, 1978 
RE: No. 76-1450, Landmark Communications, Inc. 
v. Virginia 
You suggested that a short memo would suffice in 
this case; this is just to note my agreement with the view 
expressed in your Aid to Memory that application of the 
Virginia statute to appellant violated the First Amendment. 
The main question in my mind is whether the Court 
should adopt either of the broad approaches suggested by 
appellant and supporting ~~ici, to declare (1) that the 
press ~eV~£ may be punished for publishing the truth about 
matters involving public officials or (2) that the statute 
is unconstitutional on its face, or to take a more limited 
:~ . 
seance by t at the statute was applied uncon-
stitutionally on the facts of this case. The narrowness of 
the facts as presented here is two-fold: (1) There is no 
evidence as to how the newspaper got its information, so it 
can be assumed that there was a leak and that the press 
merely published information already in its possession: the 
information published was truthful and merely conveyed 
accurate information: and the most substantial of the 
State's interests (encouragement of the effectiveness and 
proper functioning of the Commission by protecting 
complainants and witnesses) is not implicated. (2) There 
is little evidence, if any, of the legislature's assessment 
of the substantiality of the interests at stake. Nor do we 
have any assessment of how much confidentiality, if any, 
would be lost if there were no criminal sanctions for 
divulging what went on at Commission proceedings. Only two 
of the 30 or more States that have judicial inquiry 
commissions provide for criminal penalties for breach of -confidentiality. The first observation relates solely to 
the facts of this case: the second relates to the amount of 
deference to be accorded to the statute in general. 
of a First Amendment case involving overbreadth, to 
Although courts can go beyond the particular facts 
~ 
~ 
consider interests beyond those asserted by the particular
parties before the court, I do not think the Court has to 
reach the overbreadth claim here. -~ ~~ ~~-.~ Here the statute has 
been applied in the clearest situation for First Amendment 
---
3. 
protection: truthful publication by a newspaper of 
information concerning proceedings involving a public ~ 
official. The Court need only say that this application~
unconstitutional. That way the Court need not address 
whether the Stat~ ever may punish a newspaper for truthful 
reporting of facts about public officials or whether it 
ever may punish other persons, such as participants in the 
proceedings, for divulging "confidential" information. 
My reason for seeking to avoid the latter issue in 
particular is that it relates to the issues whether a judge 
may impose a gag order on participants in a criminal trial 
or bar the public (including the press) from criminal 
proceedings (~~.,the suppression hearing in the 
Philadelphia Newspapers case). If the Court were to hold 
in this case that a participant in a judicial inquiry 
proceeding could not be punished for leaking information to 
the press, that would imply that a person could not be 
punished for disobeying a judge's "gag" order in a criminal 
trial. (Of course there is the distinction that a criminal 
trial--and therefore a defendant's rights to a fair 
trial--is not at issue here.) There are strong arguments, 
of course, that the participant in the judicial inquiry 
proceeding may not be held criminally responsible for a 
leak--because of the guarantee of freedom of speech; but I 
do not think the Court should decide that question in 
deciding this case. 
Nor is it necessary for the Court to say that ~2 
State interest would be sufficient to punish a newspaper 
4. 
for divulging confidential information. The State's 
interest would have to be of the highest order, of course, 
and such an interest rarely if ever is found; but there is 
no need to pre-judge that case now. 
The questions mentioned above are harder than the 
question presented here, and should be left open. Another 
question that the Court need not decide here is whether, 
assuming that a participant could be punished for divulging 
confidential information, the press could be punished for 
soliciting such a leak. Since there is no evidence that 
that is what happened here, the Court can treat the case as 
one involving publication of information already in the ~~ 
possession of the press, even though the case is not as 
strong as Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 u.s. 469, ~~ 
where the information truly was "public" and made so by the ~· 
State. w-/o ~ 
My first preference would be to decide the case 
a straight First Amendment basis and not to reach the 
on ~ 
.J.o~ 
- - - L,~~~-~ vagueness or overbreadth challenges. There may be some -vt 
pressure, however, to reach the overbreadth claim, because 
otherwise the statute remains on the books and chills the 
First Amendment rights of others, such as the participants 
in the proceedings. Since a party has standing to make an 
overbreadth claim for others, it seems that appellant has 
standing to challenge the entire statute, not just its 
application to Landmark. But since the Court will hold the 
Jo 
statute unconstitutional as applied, there does not seem to 
be any need to reach other issues as ~ell. They would be 
unnecessary to the decision. 
N.B. 
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CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 16, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76~1450, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia 
I vote to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia. When the State seeks to punish criminally the making 
of truthful statements about public officials relating to their 
performance of their public duties, it must meet a very 
stringent burden of justification. In my view, the State has 
failed to meet this burden. All of the interests asserted by 
the State relate to the maintenance of the confidentiality of 
Judicial Commission proceedings, and such confidentiality can 
be maintained by methods less burdensom~ to clearly protected 
speech than the method at issue here. 
With regard to defining the interest protected, I would 
prefer not to place too much weight on the fact that this case 
involves a newspaper. The statute at issue applies to any 
person who divulges Commission information, so that, for 
example, an individual who reads about a Commission proceeding 
in the newspaper and repeats it to a friend would apparently 
have violated the statute. I would hold that such an 
individual is as much protected as is the newspaper, rather 
than giving the press any special protection in the 
circumstances of this case. 
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